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THE VIRUS, RISK, AND COMMERCIAL 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES:  
EXAMINING DODD-FRANK’S IMPACT IN THE 
MIDST OF A PANDEMIC 
Owen Haney* 
ABSTRACT 
When lawmakers sought to reshape the financial industry through 
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, they specifically 
attacked the “moral hazard” in the asset-backed securities market 
that they believed was partly responsible for the collapse of global 
financial markets. Congress identified several practices in asset-
backed securitizations that posed a risk to the world economy. In 
particular, regulators believed that the “originate-to-distribute” 
model, whereby loan originators—those parties armed with the best 
knowledge regarding the quality of the loans in the transaction and 
who consequently set underwriting standards—could sell off the 
loans without bearing any risk should those borrowers (homeowners 
in the residential mortgage-backed securities space, and businesses 
in the commercial mortgage-backed securities space) go into default. 
With the adoption of risk-retention rules, lawmakers hoped that 
originators would be incentivized to provide accurate information to 
investors about the risk of securitized loans because they would now 
be required to hold a swatch of the securities themselves. In addition 
to requiring loan originators to keep some “skin in the game,” Dodd-
Frank-era reforms increased disclosure requirements and altered the 
weighting of mortgage-backed securities for the purposes of risk-
based capital rules so as to make them more expensive to investors. 
In early March 2020, nearly ten years after the passage of Dodd-
Frank, the stock market plunged to historic lows once more. Over 
the course of four days, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 26%. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2021. Thank you to the Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for its outstanding edits. I also thank Professor 
Caroline Gentile for steering me toward this topic, providing excellent feedback, and, 
most of all, for her compassionate mentorship. Finally, I thank my parents and friends 
for their support during the note-writing process. 
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National unemployment suddenly rose to over 20%. Covid-19 had 
arrived in the United States, and the national financial immune 
system went into shock. Economic distress, unemployment, and 
stay-at-home orders heavily damaged American businesses, 
particularly brick-and-mortars. Commercial mortgages experienced 
rapid default because underlying businesses could not afford to make 
payments. 
The corresponding commercial mortgage-backed securities industry 
went into a tailspin, and observers were left with this unsettling 
question: did Dodd-Frank do enough to eliminate the moral hazard 
and dangerous practices that led to the last financial meltdown, or 
would this exogenous viral shock expose wrongdoing capable of 
once again systemically crippling the world economy? 
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PART I: BACKGROUND 
Since the first reported case of Covid-19 in the United States on 
January 22, 2020,1 over 31 million people in the United States have been 
infected by the virus, and over 559,000 individuals have died as a result 
of the disease.2 In addition to the virus’s devastating impact on human 
health, the economic consequences of the virus have been similarly 
grim. Stay-at-home orders and other government restrictions shuttered 
“non-essential” businesses.3 Stock prices fell precipitously in March.4  
In April, unemployment in the country peaked at 14.7%.5 The United 
States is experiencing its second recession of the 21st century.6 
The focus of this note is the impact of coronavirus on commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) and whether the virus has 
exposed systemic risk within the CMBS market. Moreover, this note 
explores whether the regulation of CMBS following the reforms of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank” or simply “the Act”)7 have positioned the country to withstand 
systemic risk embedded in the CMBS market, if it exists. 
 
 1. See Jennifer Harcourt et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 
From Patient With Coronavirus Disease, United States, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1266, 1266, 1268 (2020). 
 2. These are the statistics in the United States as of April 9, 2021, according to the 
New York Times. See Jordan Allen et al., Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and 
Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2021, 7:41 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html [https://perma.cc/G2ME-WGTH]. 
 3. See, e.g., Governor orders all non-essential workers in NY to stay home, 
WHAM (Mar. 20, 2020), https://13wham.com/news/local/governor-orders-all-non-
essential-workers-in-ny-to-stay-home [https://perma.cc/S5J9-4P3G]. 
 4. See, e.g., Coronavirus: U.S. Stocks See Worst Fall Since 1987, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51903195 [https://perma.cc/
M6XH-E26H]. 
 5. Paul Fronstin & Stephen A. Woodbury, How Many Americans Have Lost Jobs 
With Employer Health Coverage During the Pandemic?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 
3, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/oct/how-
many-lost-jobs-employer-coverage-pandemic [https://perma.cc/8M4H-4WTJ]. 
 6. Neil Irwin, The Pandemic Depression Is Over. The Pandemic Recession Has 
Just Begun., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/upshot/
pandemic-economy-recession.html [https://perma.cc/FH5P-8VZG]. 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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A. COMMERCIAL-MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 
A commercial mortgage-backed security is a debt instrument made 
up of commercial mortgage loans that are secured by the first lien in the 
underlying real estate.8 Unlike residential mortgage-backed securities 
(“RMBS”), the underlying real estate in CMBS is income-producing and 
managed for a business purpose.9 CMBS offers an alternative financing 
vehicle—distinct from an ordinary commercial real estate loan—for 
commercial properties such as hotels, malls, office buildings, and 
apartment buildings.10 
The first entity to securitize commercial mortgages in a structure 
that resembled modern CMBS was the government sponsored 
Resolution Trust Corporation in the early 1990s.11 Private CMBS 
sprouted soon after, and issuance continued to grow until the market 
collapsed in 2007.12 The CMBS market recovered after the crash in 
2007, but new issuance in 2019 was still less than half of the $250 
billion in new issuance in 2007.13 Since the risk-retention rule14 went 
into effect in 2016, new issuance of CMBS has slowed once more.15 
In an ordinary CMBS transaction, a loan originator places the 
commercial loan into a trust—a bankruptcy-remote vehicle—which in 
turn issues different classes of bonds, also known as tranches, which are 
 
 8. See Patrick Corcoran, A Property Market Framework for Bond Investors, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 1, 1 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997). 
 9. See Alice A. Lustig, The Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Market, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 75, 75 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997). 
 10. See Maegan E. O’Rourke, The New Normal: How the Dodd-Frank Risk 
Retention Rules Affect the Future of CMBS, 51 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 77, 81—82 
(2018). 
 11. See id. at 81. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Jamie Woodwell & Reggie Booker, CMBS Spreads & Issuance, MORTG. 




 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 89. 
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backed by the interest and principle of the underlying mortgages.16 
Banks participate in CMBS as originators, as investors, and as service 
providers.17 CMBS are structured so that the highest class of 
bondholders, such as the AAA-rated class, receives any return of 
principle first, while bondholders of the BBB-rated tranche will be the 
last to receive a return of principal.18 Despite the risk of the lowest rated 
tranche, the “B-Piece” bondholder often contracts for special protections 
and is often a sophisticated investor.19 When a CMBS becomes 
delinquent, meaning that a loan becomes more than 60 days past due,  
a special servicer is engaged to either extend the loan, make loan 
modifications, restructure the loan, or foreclose and sell the property.20 
Certain features of CMBS require special attention when 
considering the risks posed by CMBS to investors. Generally, CMBS 
deals consist of fewer loans than their RMBS counterparts.21 Thus, when 
a loan in the pool of loans underlying the securities goes into default, it 
may pose a greater risk of delinquency of the entire CMBS structure.22 
Moreover, CMBS deals often entail balloon loans, which require a 
substantial principal payment at loan maturity.23 If a deal calls for full 
payment of principal at maturity, delay results in balloon default.24 As  
a result, modern CMBS deals incorporate “external tail” provisions, 
which set the maturity date of the CMBS issue after the maturity date 
for the underlying loans.25 This allows the servicer time to arrange 
refinancing and to advance interest and scheduled principal payments to 
bondholders in the event of a loan default.26 
 
 16. See John N. Dunlevy, Structural Considerations Impacting CMBS, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 123, 123 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997). 
 17. See Alan Kronovet & Chris van Heerden, Chapter 2 in the History of CMBS: 
Coming to Terms with the New Rules, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 67, 71 (2016). 
 18. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 126. 
 19. O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 85. 
 20. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 129. 
 21. See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 82. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 126. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 127. 
 26. See id. 
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B. CMBS AND THE CORONAVIRUS 
The coronavirus pandemic has had a profound effect on the CMBS 
market in the United States. Commercial properties have suffered as  
a result of the recession:27 Businesses have largely transitioned to remote 
work,28 and social-distancing mandates29 and stay-at-home orders have 
reduced human interaction.30 The cumulative effect of these changes has 
been the failure of over $5.5 billion in commercial mortgage loans 
between the months of May and June 2020, or a surge of 792% for the 
same period last year.31 
Loan-level failures have traveled up the securitization pipeline 
leading to concerning levels of delinquencies in the CMBS market.  
In June 2020, the overall delinquency rate32 of loans comprised in 
CMBS was 10.32%, just two basis points off the peak delinquency rate 
for CMBS in 2012.33 
The current crisis has produced a much swifter rise in CMBS 
delinquencies than the last financial crisis (the “2007–08 Financial 
 
 27. See Irwin, supra note 6, at 6. 
 28. See Forbes Real Est. Council, 14 Big Factors Driving Commercial Real Estate 
Trends This Year, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2020/09/08/14-big-factors-driving-commercial-real-estate-
trends-this-year/?sh=75b6e63d7ee8 [https://perma.cc/468J-C36M]. 
 29. See generally Koren Miklós & Rita Pető, Business Disruptions From Social 
Distancing, 15 PLOS ONE 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239113 
[https://perma.cc/3AHE-TMLM]. 
 30. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Pandemic Risk Factors and the Role of Government 
Intervention: Evidence From COVID-19 and CMBS Mortgage Performance 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3674960 
[https://perma.cc/Q5EN-R59B]. 
 31. See Dorothy Neufeld, Commercial Mortgage Delinquencies Near Record 
Levels, VISUAL CAPITALIST (July 16, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/
mortgage-delinquencies [https://perma.cc/JZ4W-NDFU]. 
 32. “The delinquency rate is defined as the percentage of commercial real estate 
loans that were 30 or more days past due or in foreclosure. The higher the delinquency 
rate, the more likely investors in these transactions will absorb credit losses.” NAIC 
Cap. Mkts. Bureau, CMBS Market Showing Signs of Life Despite High Delinquency 
Rate, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (2018), https://www.naic.org/
capital_markets_archive/110307.htm [https://perma.cc/S9B3-3ARS].  
 33. CMBS Delinquency Rate Continues Retreat From Near All-Time High, TREPP 
(Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://info.trepp.com/hubfs/Trepp%20August%202020%20CMBS%20Delinquency%2
0Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPS6-8J7P]. 
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Crisis” or “Financial Crisis”). As of June 2020, the pandemic’s 
devastation in the CMBS market has equaled the disruption of the last 
recession, doing so four years and eight months sooner. 
Though the overall delinquency rate in CMBS has dropped from its 
June 2020 peak,34 certain sectors of the CMBS market continue to 
decay. CMBS backed by lodging reached a new high of 17.53% 
delinquency in October, while CMBS backed by retail hit 11.33% 
delinquency for the same month.35 Regional malls have been particularly 
devastated; during October they experienced a delinquency rate of 
21.06%.36 As coronavirus cases increased through the United States in 
the “second wave” of the pandemic during the end of 2020,37 the CMBS 
market may continue to deteriorate.38 
C. SYSTEMIC RISK AND CMBS 
The CMBS market is approaching a notable and dour benchmark: 
delinquencies reached 10.32% in June 2020, just below the all-time 
high-water mark of 10.34% set in July 2012.39 Despite the similarity of 
these figures, the source of the crises vastly differ. The current crisis is 
linked to the coronavirus: apartment owners, restaurants, and hotels are 
unable to pay rent as a result of the virus, leaving insufficient cash flows 
to cover mortgage payments and other debts.40 The last crisis, however, 
 
 34. New delinquencies were at 4.85% for the month of October 2020. See U.S. 
CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase in October, FITCH RATINGS (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-
resume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020 [https://perma.cc/BV2H-4NKN]. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Lisa Lockerd Maragakis, Coronavirus Second Wave? Why Cases Increase, 
JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/
conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/first-and-second-waves-of-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/DZY4-Y3LX]. 
 38. Fitch still predicts the overall delinquency rate to be less than its projection of 
8.25% and 8.75% for the end of 2020. See U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase 
in October, supra note 34. 
 39. See Paul Bubny, CMBS Delinquencies Spike in June; Near 2012 Peak (July 6, 
2020) https://www.connectcre.com/stories/cmbs-delinquencies-spike-in-june-near-
2012-peak [https://perma.cc/3H2H-25K8]. 
 40. See Peter J. Irwin et al., CMBS Loan Workouts During COVID-19: A 
Borrower’s Perspective, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514-
cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/296R-T55P]. 
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began with a steep decline in value in the housing market, which sent 
shockwaves through the rest of the economy.41 Though different sources 
of disruption, they may both be primers for systemic risk. 
Systemic risk might be quickly defined as the risk that disruption in 
the financial system will cause the collapse of the real economy.42 As an 
example of systemic risk in action, the 2007–08 Financial Crisis was 
ultimately the product of erroneous market expectations.43 Investors, 
rating agencies, and borrowers misapprehended the ability of 
homeowners to maintain mortgage payments, and firms and lenders 
found themselves overleveraged at both the institutional and loan level 
when the housing market deteriorated in 2007.44 As residential 
mortgages, particularly sub-prime mortgages, began to default, firms 
that were heavily invested in RMBS began to incur steep losses.45 Out of 
panic or uncertainty, the public and other firms retreated from 
institutions associated with asset-backed securities, and soon, firm 
liquidity and public credit evaporated.46 The recession swept in, and the 
failure of market expectations precipitated the failure of the real 
economy. 
In the wake of the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, a wealth of literature 
has spread discussing the role of banks,47 insurance companies,48 and the 
 
 41. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Samuel Dastrup, Housing and the Great Recession, 
FURMAN CTR. (Oct. 2012), https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Housingandthe
GreatRecession.pdf [https://perma.cc/V22L-3R33]. 
 42. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2019). 
 43. See Howell E. Jackson & Steven L. Schwarcz, Pandemics and Systemic 
Financial Risk 5 (Apr. 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3580425 [https://perma.cc/R6YK-3BDQ]. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Rebecca Keats, U.S. Banks Played a Pivotal Role in the 2008 
Financial Crisis, MKT. REALIST (Jan. 2016), https://marketrealist.com/2015/11/us-
banks-played-pivotal-role-2008-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/MPK8-NSML]. 
 48. See, e.g., Prudential Is Freed From “Too Big to Fail” Label and the Tough 
Oversight That Came With It, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-prudential-too-big-to-fail-20181017-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/NKL5-UDB9]. 
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interdependence of markets in the creation of systemic risk.49 While the 
literature generally agrees that systemic risk arises from any disturbance 
that works itself through the economic system to an extent that 
compromises the public’s confidence in the financial system and its 
stability as a whole, scholars offer numerous methods of quantifying, 
measuring, and insuring against systemic risk.50 These methods deserve 
a student’s note worth of discussion all their own. 
In short, systemic risk is tied to size. If a financial institution is 
large enough, and if a financial market is massive enough, then the 
failure of the institution or the market will result in the collapse of all 
related institutions or markets.51 Though the securitization of sub-prime 
residential mortgages is among the most commonly cited reasons behind 
the 2007–08 Financial Crisis,52 Congress sought to eliminate other 
issues in the CMBS markets which it perceived to have played a role in 
the economy’s collapse.53 While Congress sought to curb these 
behaviors, there is still no certainty whether the CMBS market, on its 
own, contributes to systemic risk.54 
During the period between 1998 and 2007, the CMBS market 
rapidly expanded and CMBS became the dominant financing vehicle for 
the commercial real estate industry.55 As the popularity of CMBS grew, 
so too did its investor pool. Where B-Piece investors were once the 
same pool of sophisticated risk-savvy investors,56 the subordinated 
tranche of CMBS increasingly became the eye for investors in CDOs, or 
collateralized debt obligations.57 These investors profited by purchasing, 
packaging, and re-securitizing the first-loss B-Piece to its own pool of 
investors.58 This “originate to securitize” model eliminated risk to 
 
 49. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: The Interconnection 
Problem in Financial Markets and Financial Regulation, a European (Banking) Union 
Perspective, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 271, 272 (2014). 
 50. See generally Cristina Georgiana Zeldea, Systemic Risk: An Overview, 2019 
FIN. STUD. 35, 38–43 (2019). 
 51. See Joseph Haubrich & Charlotte DeKoning, Sizing Up Systemic Risk, 13 
ECON. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2017). 
 52. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate 
Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 84 (2013). 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 108. 
 55. See id. at 97. 
 56. Id. at 98. 
 57. See id. at 102. 
 58. Id. 
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originators, while exposing a less sophisticated market participant to the 
most risk-laden investment in CMBS. 
As competition for subordinated and other classes of CMBS 
securities increased, underwriting standards deteriorated.59 Debt-service-
coverage ratios (“DSCRs”) declined during this period, meaning that 
mortgage cash flows were increasingly unable to cover the underlying 
commercial collateral’s debt obligations.60 Studies of commercial real 
estate associate a decline of DSCR ratio with defaults in mortgage 
loans.61 
Meanwhile, rating agencies, facing a fierce level of competition 
among one another, were quick to give risky CMBS investments higher 
grades.62 Thus, originators became less scrupulous regarding the health 
of the underlying collateral, just as rating agencies became more likely 
to overlook the signs of a risky investment in order to win more 
business. These perverse incentives lead to a CMBS market rife with 
misinformation between lenders and originators, resulting in dangerous 
consequences for investors. When the CMBS market collapsed in 2007, 
Congress and market-watchers took note of the rampant moral hazard 
and focused their regulatory efforts on eliminating these issues. 
D. DODD-FRANK AND CMBS 
In response to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, lawmakers enacted the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.63  
The single largest piece of modern financial legislation targeted changes 
in multiple areas of financial markets, which included numerous 
provisions aimed at asset-backed securities (“ABS”).64 The Act 
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission and other 
 
 59. See id. at 104. 
 60. See id. 
 61. J. Zachary Monsma & Janet G. Price, A Property Market Framework for Bond 
Investors, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 237, 
240–41 (Frank J. Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997). 
 62. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 108. 
 63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 64. DODD-FRANK: WHAT IT DOES AND WHY IT’S FLAWED 11, 103–04 (Hester 
Peirce & James Broughel eds., 2012). 
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agencies with broad rulemaking powers pursuant to regulating 
markets.65 
As a result of these agency delegations, numerous regulations that 
affect CMBS have gone into effect over the last decade, including risk-
retention requirements for ABS sponsors, increased disclosure 
requirements, the Volcker Rule, and enhanced capitalization 
requirements for banks.66 
Each of these changes will be discussed in detail in Part II.  
In Part III, the paper will focus on how these regulations have bolstered 
the CMBS market against systemic risk incident to the coronavirus. 
PART II: REGULATION OF CMBS POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Following the challenges faced by the mortgage-backed securities 
industry during the last recession, Congress and federal agencies enacted 
several important laws and regulations that affected CMBS. 
A. THE VOLCKER RULE 
Perceived by some commentators as the most controversial legal 
change in response to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis,67 Section 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (widely known as the “Volcker Rule,” or herein, “the 
Rule”)68 prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading 
and from sponsoring or investing in a hedge or private equity fund.69 
Among the various policy justifications behind the Volcker Rule, the 
 
 65. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 2 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267); 
SEC Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2014); 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)); John 
Walter, U.S. Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes Since the Financial Crisis, 
105 ECON. Q. 1, 2 (2019). 
 67. Ryan Bubb & Marcel Kahan, Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the 
Volcker Rule, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2018). 
 68. The Rule inherits its name from its proponent, former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Paul Volcker. Jordan Schiff, The Volcker Rule in Practice: Its Impact, 
Reception, and Evolving Profile, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 744, 745 (2020). 
 69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). 
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most salient is that banks, because of their importance to the stability of 
the economy, should not trade on their own account, and should not 
invest in funds on its own account, because of the risk of the bank’s 
failure, or the bank’s failure or loss in liquidity by virtue of its exposure 
to a failed fund.70 
Proponents of the Volcker Rule point to the conflicts of interest that 
existed before the Rule’s existence—banks exploiting client information 
to make trades on their own account, or even selling financial products 
to clients which were designed to fail.71 These banking abuses, however, 
are not associated with the collapse of the economy in 2008, or with 
systemic risk in general.72 For example, the Volcker Rule does not 
prevent banks from originating, selling, or investing in subprime 
mortgages—practices that are associated with the 2007–08 Financial 
Crisis. Indeed, the efficacy of the Volcker Rule as a macroprudential 
device has been in question since before its enactment.73 
Though the Rule permits banks to engage in “market-making,”74 
lawmakers and commentators at the time of the Rule’s enactment 
recognized the challenge faced by regulators who would have to 
distinguish between illegal proprietary trading and legal market-making 
activity.75 In response to fear of running afoul of the Volcker Rule, 
 
 70. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 
48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 515, 533 (2011). 
 71. Id. at 523. 
 72. See Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not 
Central to Crisis, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-
Economy20l0/idUSTRE62T56420100330 [https://perma.cc/A5FE-HW4V]. 
 73. Letter from Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, United States House of 
Representatives to Members of the United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Servs. 
Oversight Council (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
 74. Lee Meyerson & Keith Noreika, Finalized Changes to Volcker Rule, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/12/
finalized-changes-to-volcker-rule [https://perma.cc/M8PM-VCBJ]. 
 75. See Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability, supra note 73, 
at 1312 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the S. Banking, Hous. & 
Urb. Affs. Comm.) (stating that an individual in the banking industry told him that he 
“can find a way to say that virtually any trade we make is somehow related to serving 
one of our clients. They can go ahead and impose the rule on Friday, and I can assure 
you that by Monday we will find a way around it.”). 
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commentators have posited that banks have contracted their market-
making functions.76 
According to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, one of 
the largest lobbying firms in CMBS,77 the Rule has “hindered both 
market making functions necessary to ensure a healthy level of market 
liquidity and hedging necessary to mitigate risk.”78 In May 2018, the 
Chairman of the Consumer Real Estate Finance Council stated that the 
Council would work with regulators and members on changes to the 
current compliance regime to restore liquidity in CMBS to a “level that 
has been lacking post the enactment of the Volcker Rule.”79 In October 
2019, a collection of federal agencies80 amended the Volcker Rule to 
exclude privately offered credit funds from “covered funds” under the 
Volcker Rule.81 The agencies acknowledged that the original rule 
“‘inhibited’ the ability of banking entities to originate loans and extend 
credit, in contravention of the intent of the Volcker Rule.”82 
Whether the recent amendment to the Volcker Rule will increase 
liquidity in the CMBS marketplace and stave off the commercial 
mortgage crisis remains to be seen.83 As of May 2021, the delinquency 
 
 76. Simon Nixon, Why Liquidity-Starved Markets Fear the Worst, WALL ST. J. 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-liquidity-starved-markets-fear-the-
worst-1432153849 [https://perma.cc/37A9-5ZZW] (“Banks have become so reluctant 
to make markets that it has become hard to execute large trades even in the vast 
foreign-exchange and government-bond markets without moving prices, raising fears 
investors will take unexpectedly large losses when they try to sell.”). 
 77. Client Profile: Mortgage Bankers Ass’n of America, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2003&id
=D000000309 [https://perma.cc/UM3V-4BCT] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (illustrating 
that the Mortgage Bankers Association employed 24 lobbyists in 2020). 
 78. Erika Morphy, The Volcker Rule’s Proposed Revision Could Add Liquidity to 
CMBS, GLOBEST.COM (May 31, 2018, 7:31 AM), https://www.globest.com/2018/05/31/
the-volcker-rules-proposed-revision-could-add-liquidity-to-cmbs [https://perma.cc/
QVW9-UHMX]. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Volcker Rule 2.0: Some Helpful Upgrades and Bug Fixes—Update Your 




 81. SEC Covered Funds Activities and Investments, 17 C.F.R. § 255.10 (2014). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Newly Adopted Volcker Rule Amendments Expand Opportunities for Banks 
to Sponsor and Invest in Private Credit Funds, CLIFFORD CHANCE (July 2020), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2020/07/Newly-
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rate in the CMBS marketplace was 4.12%.84 If the amendment does 
counteract the deterioration of CMBS then it is notable that deregulation 
of the CMBS industry, and not increased regulation, has had a positive 
effect. 
B. REGULATION AB II 
In 2014, the SEC deployed amendments to Regulation AB and 
other disclosure-based regulations to require increased disclosure 
regarding asset-backed security offerings, including commercial 
mortgage-backed securities.85 These regulatory changes, collectively 
termed “Regulation AB II,” were a response to “concerns about the 
operation of [the SEC’s] rules in the securitization market.”86 In its 
summary of the changes to the rules, the SEC remarked that “the 
financial crisis highlighted that investors and other participants in the 
securitization market did not have the necessary information and time to 
be able to fully assess the risks underlying asset-backed securities and 
did not value asset-backed securities properly or accurately.”87 
Specifically, the SEC attributed “the failure[s] of credit ratings” and 
“the collapse of ‘investment-grade rated securities’” to the economic 
devastation wrought by the 2007–08 Financial Crisis.88 Thus, Regulation 
AB II seeks to provide ABS investors with “improved pricing 
accuracy,” unfiltered by credit rating agencies, in the form of mandated 
asset-level data disclosures.89 For CMBS issuers, “[t]he asset-level data 
required will, in general, include information about the credit quality of 
the obligor, the collateral related to each asset, the cash flows related to 




 84. U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Tick Up in April for First Time since October 2020, 
FITCH RATINGS (May 7, 2021), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-
finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-tick-up-in-april-for-first-time-since-october-2020-07-
05-2021 [https://perma.cc/8Z5K-LW4P]. 
 85. Charles A. Sweet, The SEC Finally Adopts Regulation AB II, 20 J. 
STRUCTURED FIN. 22, 22 (2015). 
 86. SEC Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 229 
(2014). 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Id. at 41. 
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and whether and how payment terms change over time and the 
performance of each asset over the life of a security.”90 
In addition to asset-level data disclosures, Regulation AB II 
increased required disclosures from minority originators,91 required 
issuers to provide prospectuses to investors five days before sale,92 and 
mandated the appointment of an “assets representations reviewer.”93 
Notably, Regulation AB II also requires that the Chief Executive 
Officer in charge of the securitization certify that, inter alia, she has 
reviewed, and is familiar with the pool assets, the structure of the 
securitization, and all material transaction documents; that the 
prospectus does not contain any untrue statements; and that the 
prospectus and registration fairly present the risks of ownership of the 
proposed ABS.94 The CEO certification requirement makes senior 
officers liable under Section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act for 
material misstatements or omissions.95 According to the SEC, prior to 
Regulation AB II, it had “been difficult to hold senior officers of ABS 
issuers accountable for the failure to provide accurate information.”96 
Thus, Regulation AB II broadly focuses on correcting investor 
over-reliance on credit agencies, on the pre-recession challenge of 
punishing CEOs, and to regulate more parties involved in ABS 
transactions. Despite the overhaul of ABS disclosures, a recent 
ProPublica report suggests that rampant fraud and material 
misstatements continue to plague the CMBS sector.97 Furthermore, it 
remains unclear how increased disclosure requirements can reduce 
systemic risk in CMBS. 
 
 90. Id. at 72. 
 91. See Sweet, supra note 86, at 24. 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 229. 
 93. Sweet, supra note 86, at 26. 
 94. 17 C.F.R. § 229. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 332. 
 97. See Heather Vogell, Whistleblower: Wall Street Has Engaged in Widespread 
Manipulation of Mortgage Funds, PROPUBLICA (May 15, 2020), 
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C. CAPITALIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
Every federally insured depository institution in the United States is 
required by law to maintain adequate levels of capital.98 Without a 
capitalization requirement, United States regulators believe banks would 
tend to retain less capital and make riskier investments because they 
know “governments and deposit insurers [will] end up holding the bag” 
if their investments go sour.99 
Following the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, Dodd-Frank enacted 
changes to United States capital requirements, which affected the CMBS 
market.100 Under the current scheme, banks that participate in  
“plain vanilla banking activities” need only be “adequately capitalized,” 
while banks that engage in CMBS trading need to be “well 
capitalized.”101 
Notably, risk-based capital requirements also apply to insurance 
companies.102 At the end of 2019, $173.5 billion worth of life-insurance 
CMBS holdings were included in risk-based capital computations.103 
According to CMBS insiders, the risk-weighting of CMBS under 
these regulations has negatively impacted private-label CMBS and made 
CMBS more expensive under risk-based capital rules.104 During the 
peak of the CMBS market in 2007, outstanding debt exceeded $800 
billion.105 In March 2020, outstanding debt for the CMBS market had 
 
 98. See John Walter, U.S. Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes Since the 
Financial Crisis, 105 ECON. Q. 1, 2 (2019). 
 99. Id. at 1 (quoting Sheila Bair). 
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2011), https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2011/11-01-03-dodd-frank-
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 103. Louie Woodall, U.S. Life Insurers Exposed to $130bn of CMBS, RISK 
QUANTUM (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/7522206/us-life-insurers-
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 104. See C.R.E. Letter, supra note 101. 
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fallen to $490 billion.106 In comparison, outstanding RMBS debt reached 
$2.2 trillion in 2007.107 
Prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, however, favorable risk-
weighting of CMBS led to a higher demand and larger market for 
private-label CMBS.108 Authors Stanton and Wallace suggest that 
between 2002 and 2008, regulatorily mandated capital savings were 
responsible for significant distortions in prices that institutional 
investors were willing to pay for CMBS when compared to similarly 
rated RMBS and corporate bonds.109 Furthermore, Opp, Opp, and Harris 
argue that regulatory capital shifts prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis 
reduced the incentive of rating agencies to acquire information about 
underlying assets, leading to inaccurate bond ratings.110 
These studies illustrate the influence that capital requirements had 
over CMBS prior to the financial crisis. Though the size of the market 
and the complexity of CMBS products have changed since the financial 
crisis,111 the major players in CMBS have remained stable, with hedge 
funds, capital management firms, and life insurance companies retaining 
large portions of the sector.112 Given the stability and similar 
sophistication of CMBS investors over time, alterations in capital 
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In the aftermath of the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) designated numerous institutions 
as “systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”).113 Most of 
these firms were banks, while three of these companies were insurance 
companies: Prudential, AIG, and MetLife.114 During the course of the 
Trump administration, regulators either removed these designations or 
the companies successfully sued to have the designations removed.115 
Regardless of their SIFI designation, commentators and lawmakers 
alike recognize the importance of these institutions to the world 
economy and may recall the controversial bailout of AIG during the 
2007–08 Financial Crisis.116 With exposure to CMBS approximating 
$130 billion in April 2020,117 regulators may be wise to deploy risk-
based capital rules to forestall yet larger catastrophes due to CMBS 
positions now and in the future. 
D. RISK-RETENTION 
According to Barney Frank, the architect behind Dodd-Frank, the 
“single most important part of the bill”118 was the requirement that 
regulatory agencies draft a rule mandating that the sponsor of  
a securitization retain not less than 5% of the credit risk of any asset 
conveyed to a third party.119 Prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, 
 
 113. See Jim Zarroli, GE Capital Wants Off the List of Too-Big-To-Fail Institutions, 
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 117. See Woodall, supra note 104. 
 118. Floyd Norris, Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES 
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lenders increasingly profited by originating loans and then off-loading 
their risk by selling them into securitization pools.120 This process 
increased bank liquidity and made credit more widely available, but 
disincentivized banks to engage in adequate underwriting.121 This 
“originate-to-distribute” model is associated with widespread 
deterioration in asset-backed securities during the Financial Crisis.122 
In 2014, then-SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar remarked that “risk 
retention rules are intended to align the incentives of sponsors and ABS 
investors by requiring sponsors to retain a financial interest and maintain 
skin in the game.”123 
Four years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, and two years after the 
passage of the final rule, the 5% risk-retention requirement took effect in 
late 2016 for new issuance of CMBS.124 
Sponsors of CMBS may comply with the 5% risk-retention 
requirement in one of three ways: by retaining an eligible horizontal 
residual interest, an eligible vertical interest, or an “L-shaped” slice—
some combination equaling at least 5% of the fair market value of the 
security.125 
Retaining an eligible vertical interest translates into holding an 
equal portion of each tranche of the security equaling 5% of the total 
risk of the security.126 Sponsors may also retain a 5% horizontal share of 
the most subordinated class of the security, the so-called B-Piece.127 
Because of the first-loss nature of the B-Piece buyer, investors in this 
position are considered more sophisticated, and hence, need not take on 
additional interest in the security.128 The “L-shaped” interest may be 
captured by combining some vertical or horizontal interests in the 
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with the rule with regard to [CMBS] is required beginning December 24, 2016.”). 
 125. See id. at 77604, 77644. 
 126. See id. at 77607. 
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security, so long as they equate to no less than 5% of the aggregate risk 
of the security.129 
Initial responses from the CMBS market to the risk-retention rules 
were grim: Some experts declared that the minimum 5% vertical interest 
to be too expensive for most sponsors,130 while others insisted that the 
opacity of the rules would slow the market to a crawl.131 Despite these 
initial concerns, new issuance in CMBS has climbed in every year since 
the Financial Crisis.132 
In addition to failing to slow the issuance of CMBS, Sean J. Flynn 
Jr. and his colleagues suggest that risk-retention rules serve to reduce 
asymmetrical information between buyer and seller.133 In addition to 
ensuring that sponsors retain some “skin in the game,” a driving force 
behind risk-retention was addressing information asymmetry between 
issuers and investors.134 This asymmetry, according to the SEC, gave 
rise to the moral hazard of sponsors incurring risks when they knew they 
would not be exposed to the losses.135 
Under Flynn, Ghent & Tchistyi’s analysis, the choice of risk-
retention structure (i.e., horizontal residual interest, vertical interest, 
etc.) influences bond pricing.136 The study reveals that bond issuers are 
able to sell bonds for higher prices when the loan sponsor retains  
 
 129. See id. at 77607. 
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a horizontal residual structure of the most subordinated class.137  
In effect, issuers can signal to buyers that the collateral supporting the 
security is of satisfactory quality by taking on the riskiest portion of the 
transaction.138 If risk-based capital rules are the blunt swords that 
massively influence the cost of capital in CMBS investments, risk-
retention rules are the fine blades that issuers deploy to signal to buyers 
that the underlying transaction is a strong one. 
PART III: DODD-FRANK’S LEGACY AND THE CORONAVIRUS 
Despite the wide-sweeping nature of Dodd-Frank’s reforms, it has 
failed to calibrate the CMBS market to withstand exogenous shocks, 
such as those resulting from a pandemic. Despite a strong 2019, the 
CMBS market deteriorated in the fall of 2020.139 Meanwhile, the CMBS 
market is smaller140 and has fewer unique participants141 in 2020 than it 
did in 2007. Dodd-Frank may be partly responsible for these 
observations. Given the contraction of the CMBS market, and the fact 
that the public and other banks are not retreating from CMBS 
participants, the deterioration of CMBS may not pose a systemic risk to 
the economy. 
A. DODD-FRANK’S EFFECT ON MODERN CMBS 
The current CMBS market is a fraction of the size of its peak in 
2007.142 This may in part be the result of Dodd-Frank regulation.  
The Dodd-Frank risk-retention requirement has made CMBS more 
expensive to both borrowers and issuers. Since the implementation of 
risk-retention, borrowers pay higher interest rates to obtain less 
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 138. Id. at 5135–36. 
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favorable loan terms while issuers retain more risk than they did before 
risk retention.143 While this has the effect of making CMBS safer  
to investors,144 the market has contracted since the implementation of 
risk-retention rules.145 
Additionally, investors now use risk-retention structure as a signal 
for collateral quality.146 Where investors once evaluated the amount of 
risk that an issuer retained for themselves a signal for collateral quality, 
all issuers must now retain 5% of the credit risk.147 Since issuers do not 
retain more than 5%, investors now look to an issuer’s choice of risk-
retention structure to determine the security’s quality.148 At the present 
moment, it is unclear whether retention-structure is a more efficient 
signal than pre-Dodd-Frank volume-of-risk signaling.149 As a result, 
risk-retention rules have made CMBS more expensive to issuers, and 
possibly less efficient to investors. 
As detailed in Part II, capitalization requirements have made the 
CMBS market a challenging entry point for smaller banks who lack the 
capital reserves to support significant CMBS holdings.150 In effect, the 
participants in the CMBS market are increasingly large banks.151 In the 
first quarter of 2020, the eight largest loan contributors to CMBS were 
Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan 
Chase, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America.152 These eight institutions all 
fall within the top twenty largest banks by asset size in the United 
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States.153 Their combined market share for all new issuance of CMBS in 
Q1 2020 was just over 69%.154 This top-8 concentration among loan 
contributors resembles the top-8 market share of loan contributors 
before the 2007–08 Financial Crisis.155 
Prior to the Great Recession, industry regulators warned that a high 
concentration of commercial real estate holdings would make 
institutions vulnerable to “cyclical commercial real estate markets.”156 
Additionally, with a high concentration among top loan contributors the 
market is more vulnerable to shocks.157 
Similarly, industry commentators allege that the Volcker Rule has 
diminished the capacity of banks to function as market-makers, making 
CMBS more challenging to trade.158 Though the Rule has a carve-out for 
market-making, banks may be reticent to trade CMBS if they doubt 
regulator’s capacity to distinguish between market-making and 
illegitimate transactions. 
This is not to suggest that Dodd-Frank has made CMBS a safer 
market space for investors. Indeed, Dodd-Frank intended to eliminate 
information asymmetry and align incentives between banks and 
investors, but the predominant observation following the Dodd-Frank 
reforms has been the decline of new issuance in CMBS.159 
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B. THE CORONAVIRUS FALLOUT IN CMBS 
Despite the recent downturn in the CMBS market due to  
the coronavirus pandemic, the real economy is insulated from the 
disturbances in the CMBS landscape. As discussed in Part I, market size 
is a factor that economists commonly consider relevant in systemic risk 
analysis.160 
As discussed in Part II, total outstanding debt in the CMBS market 
in March 2020 was $480 billion.161 At the peak of the CMBS market in 
2007, there was $800 billion in total outstanding debt.162 Since the 
2007–08 Financial Crisis and the implementation of Dodd-Frank, the 
CMBS market has markedly contracted. The CMBS market is now 
about half the size of the CMBS market before the last recession.163 
Some commentators are uncertain whether CMBS contributed to 
systemic risk even at the height of dysfunction in the CMBS market in 
2007.164 Since the market is now half its peak size, it follows that the 
CMBS market poses even less systemic risk than its mid-2000s 
predecessor. 
Though the market remains concentrated at the top, with the same 
major participants as 2007,165 Dodd-Frank has unwittingly neutralized 
the market’s potential to pose systemic risk. Where Congress sought to 
root out the moral hazard that it believed contributed to the 2007–08 
Financial Crisis, the Dodd-Frank reforms instead succeeded in 
minimizing the market’s potential to contribute to global economic 
instability. However, instead of eliminating the behaviors it saw as risk-
making, the reforms only made those behaviors less profitable.166 
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Risk retention rules made CMBS more expensive to smaller 
investors and also made signaling less efficient.167 The Volcker Rule 
made market-making more challenging for banks.168 Risk-based capital 
rules made CMBS holdings more expensive for banks.169 These 
measures, as narrowly intentioned as they might have been, resulted in 
broad and sweeping effects. Dodd-Frank and the disasters of RMBS 
halted all growth in CMBS. Therefore, even as Covid-19 shutters hotels, 
businesses, and more commercial real estate across the United States, 
the damage to CMBS is unlikely to cause yet greater damage to the 
economy. The CMBS market is sufficiently insulated so that a mass-
delinquency event in CMBS, such as the United States experienced in 
2020, will not trigger a global financial meltdown. 
CONCLUSION 
The deadly virus which has changed so many aspects of daily life 
will not harm the world economy through any systemic risk posed by 
CMBS. Though the virus has wreaked havoc and caused delinquencies 
to reach near-unprecedented levels in CMBS, the Dodd-Frank reforms 
have caused the CMBS market to contract to such an extent that further 
CMBS deterioration will not pose systemic risk to the economy. 
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